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THE NECESSITY OF CONVERSATION TO 
HORIZONTAL(FIAT) ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES: 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Organizational structure may be defined as the network of relation-
ships that exists among various positions and position holders. More over 
any organization is considered as a network of contracts, agreements and 
informal arrangements between individuals members of the organization. 
Contract is an agreement about the terms of the exchange of powers, 
concluded as a result of free and informed choice of the parties and meets 
the specific institutional conditions. The important role in this process is 
beloged to transaction costs. Better conception of the transaction costs is a 
conception of C. J. Dalman. C. J. Dalman following coined the concept of 
transaction costs: a «cost of collecting and processing information, nego-
tiating and decision-making, monitoring and enforcement of the contract». 
The existence of transaction costs will push willing to trade for the intro-
duction of various forms of business practices to reduce transaction costs in 
the case where the cost of generation of such forms be less than the savings 
on transaction costs. The choice of partners, contract type, selection of 
products and services – all may change. But, perhaps, the most important 
form of adaptation to the problem of the existence of transaction costs is 
the emergence of the firm. 
According to the theorem of R. H. Coase «The company is growing 
until the internal costs of the company will not exceed the market costs» 
An important step in the further development of transaction theory was the 
work of A. Alchian, G.Demsetz. The essence of the company they are tak-
en out of the benefits of cooperation when jointly using a resource in the 
composition of a team, you can achieve better results than acting alone. 
However, the production of a unified «team» makes it difficult to assess the 
contribution of each participant to the overall result, creating the incentives 
for «shirking». Approval Alchian and Demsetz, control over deviant beha-
vior efficiently carried out within a firm when one of the participants (own-
er) assumes the functions of supervision over the others. But since the abili-
ty of the Central agent to prevent «procrastination» is also limited, at a cer-
tain point the costs of a «team» activities begin to outweigh the benefits, so 
that further expansion of the firm becomes inefficient. These are starting 
prerequisits for our reseach the problem of convinsation to flat organiza-
tional structures. 
